Introduction
Deontic logic concerns the formal study of obligations, permissions, and prohibitions. Since its inception, it has been a lively and fruitful branch of philosophical logic. It has long been confined, however, to the study of norms within single-agent or agentless contexts. The recent development of multi-agent logics of agency and ability has made it possible to transpose deontic logic from single-agent to multiagent settings. As a result, multi-agent deontic logic studies obligations, permissions, and prohibitions within the context of formal models of strategic interactions between (groups of) agents with different preferences. 1 Strategic interactions between (coalitions of) players with different preferences are, of course, also studied in game theory. Hence, multi-agent deontic logic and game theory both study multi-agent phenomena that are largely comparable, although they approach them from widely diverging perspectives: whereas deontic logicians concentrated on the formal structure of moral obligations, game theorists focussed on the mathematics of canons of instrumental rationality. The question of how to establish connections between this new multi-agent deontic logic and game theory is therefore both natural and pressing.
The aim of the present paper is to give a partial answer to this question: we characterize Nash equilibria of strategic games in terms of conditional permissions from multi-agent deontic logic. To do so, we first define a formal language for multi-agent deontic logic and a class of consequentialist models to formally interpret the formulas of that language. Second, we give standard definitions of strategic games and Nash equilibria. Third, we define a transformation T and a valuation function v that convert any strategic game G into a consequentialist model T(G), v . Fourth, we show that an outcome a * is a Nash equilibrium of strategic game G if and only if a finite conjunction of conditional permissions is true in the consequentialist model T(G), v .
Multi-agent Deontic Logic
Our present deontic logic studies the logical behavior of two types of permissions: (1) absolute permissions of the form "Group G best furthers group F's interest by performing action α G " (abbreviated as P F G α G ) and (2) conditional permissions of the form "If group H were to perform action α H , then group G would best further group F's interest by performing action α G " (abbreviated as P F G (α G /α H )).
Language
Our modal language L is built from a countable set A = {α n G : G ⊆ N and n ∈ N} of atomic propositions, where N is a finite set of agents and N is the set of natural numbers. Thus, for each group G of agents there is a countable set
. .} of atomic propositions. We use α G and α H as variables for atomic propositions in A. The formal language L is the smallest set satisfying the conditions (i) through (vi):
We interpret the formulas in L in terms of consequentialist models.
Consequentialist Models
Consequentialist models are Kripke-style possible worlds models, built from a nonempty set of possible worlds and a finite set of agents. Each group of agents is assigned its own choice set of options for acting. A group of agents performs an action by choosing an option from its choice set. Each choice set is modelled as a partition of the total set of possible worlds, and hence a group of agents performs an action by restricting the total set of possible worlds to those worlds that are elements of the option that corresponds to the action being performed. Each group of agents has its own preference relation over the total set of possible worlds. These preference relations guide a group of agents in choosing the most advantageous option(s) from its choice set. 2 The following definitions make these ideas precise:
where W is a non-empty set of possible worlds, N is a finite set of agents, Choice is a choice function, and F is a reflexive, transitive, and complete relation on W for each F ⊆ N .
Choice sets of individual agents are given by a function Choice : N → ℘(℘(W)) that meets two conditions: (1) for each individual agent i ∈ N it holds that Choice(i) is a partition of W, and (2) for each selection function s assigning to each individual agent i ∈ N a set of possible worlds s(i) such that s(i) ∈ Choice(i) it holds that i∈N s(i) is non-empty. Next, we extend the choice function for individual agents to a function Choice : ℘(N ) → ℘(℘(W)) for groups of agents. Let Select be the set of all selection functions s assigning to each individual agent i ∈ N an option s(i) ∈ Choice(i). Then
Definition 2 A consequentialist model M is an ordered pair F, v , where F is a consequentialist frame and v a valuation function that for each G ⊆ N assigns to each atomic proposition α G ∈ A an action K ∈ Choice(G).
Absolute and Conditional F-Dominance
In search of a formal interpretation of absolute and conditional permissions, we start from Apostel's dictum that "an act is permissible if it can be considered as the application of a strategy such that there is no better one (there may be many equally good)" (Apostel 1960, p. 75) . In the present context, this means that for each group G of agents we need to order the actions available to it in terms of the preference relations F over the total set of possible worlds. Hence, we need to transform each preference relation F into an F-ordering of the set Choice(G). We adopt the notion of weak dominance and adapt it to the present situation.
Definition 3 Let F be a consequentialist frame. Let F, G ⊆ N and H ⊆ N − G.
and for all w, w ′ ∈ W it holds that if w ∈ K∩S and w ′ ∈ K ′ ∩S, then w F w ′ .
Semantics
Now that we have defined the notions of a consequentialist model, of absolute and conditional F-dominance, we are in a position to provide the semantical rules to interpret the formulas in L.
Definition 4 (Semantical Rules) Let M = F, v be a consequentialist model. Let F, G ⊆ N and let H ⊆ N − G. Let w ∈ W and let α G , α H ∈ A and ϕ, ψ ∈ L. Then
We write M |= ϕ, if for all possible worlds w in W it holds that M, w |= ϕ.
It should be noted that our formal semantics provides truth conditions for a wide variety of conditional permissions. We can distinguish at least four different types of conditional permissions: (1) conditional permissions where G is a non-singleton group of agents, (2) conditional permissions where G and H do not partition the grand coalition, (3) conditional permissions where the acting group G does not coincide with the interest group F, and (4) conditional permissions of the form P i i (α i /α N −i ). We only need the last type to characterize Nash equilibria of strategic games.
Nash Equilibria of Strategic Games
The following definitions of strategic games and Nash equilibria are provided by (Osborne & Rubinstein 1994) . We also adopt their notational conventions. 3
Definition 5 A strategic game G is a triple N, (A i ), ( i ) , where N is a finite set of players, for each player i ∈ N it holds that A i is a non-empty set of actions available to player i, and for each player i ∈ N it holds that i is a preference relation on the set of outcomes A = × i∈N A i .
We assume each A i to be finite or countably infinite. Preference relations i are assumed to be reflexive, transitive, and complete. We use a i and a * i as variables for actions in A i . Likewise, a and a * are variables for outcomes in A.
Given a strategic game N, (A i ), ( i ) , for each non-empty coalition G ⊆ N we define the set A G of actions available to coalition G as A G = × i∈G A i . We use a G and a * G as variables for actions in A G . Definition 6 An outcome a * ∈ A is a Nash equilibrium of a strategic game G = N, (A i ), ( i ) if and only if for each player i ∈ N it holds that
From Strategic Games to Consequentialist Models
Any strategic game can be converted into a consequentialist model. We first define a transformation T that converts any strategic game G into a consequentialist frame T(G). To obtain an appropriate consequentialist model T(G), v from this frame, we then define a suitable valuation function v.
The operator T transforms any strategic game into a consequentialist frame: Theorem 1 Let G be a strategic game. Then T(G) is a consequentialist frame.
We now must define a valuation function v to obtain a consequentialist model T(G), v . To establish a formal connection between Nash equilibria and conditional permissions, we need to keep track of which atomic proposition α G in A G is validated by the performance of which action a G in A G .
To ensure this, we use an injective map f that for each G ⊆ N assigns to each action a G in each A G an atomic proposition α G in A G . If there is an action a G in A G such that f (a G ) = α G , then we define v f (α G ) = {(a G , a −G ) ∈ A : a −G ∈ A −G } (note that a G is unique, since f is injective). If there is no action a G in A G such that f (a G ) = α G , then we simply put v f (α G ) = K for some unique designated K ∈ Choice(G). Any valuation function v f for T(G) that is based on such an injection f will henceforth be called a suitable valuation function.
Nash Equilibria and Conditional Permissions
Conditional permissions enable us to give a formal characterization of Nash equilibria of strategic games in terms of conditional permissions:
Theorem 2 Let G be a strategic game and let v f be a suitable valuation function for T(G). Then a * is a Nash equilibrium of G iff T(G), v f |= i∈N P i i (f (a * i )/f (a * −i )).
